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Abstract We explore the quality of political representation of constituents’
preferences for budgetary decisions within a quasi-experimental setting. In the
Swiss referendum process, constituents reveal their preferences for budgetary pro-
posals which are either expected to increase or decrease public debts. We match
individual politicians’ voting behavior on debt increasing and debt reducing legis-
lative proposals with eight real referendum decisions on exactly the same issues
from 2008 to 2011. Thereby, we directly explore deviations of politicians from
constituents’ preferences with respect to budgetary policies.
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1 Introduction
Government debt accumulation is often explained by the interaction of competing
interest groups and political parties (Alesina and Drazen 1991; Drazen and Grilli
1993; Brennan 2011). Interest groups tend to lobby for higher subsidies and
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preferential tax treatment. However, representatives are not only dependent on
interest groups but also on the constituency which determines their reelection.
As constituents have preferences for increasing or decreasing public debts, the
actual development of debts may also reflect the representation of citizens’
preferences.
Large deviations in parliamentary decisions from citizens’ preferences have been
reported in the literature (see Stratmann 1995; Gerber and Lewis 2004; Stadelmann
et al. 2012a, b). Such deviations may depend on factors such as electoral systems
and the personal interests of politicians but the respective literature is still sparse.
This article aims to explore the deviation of politicians’ decisions from constituents’
preferences with respect to budgetary policies with a particular focus on
representation of preferences for public debts.
Switzerland offers a unique quasi-experimental setting for a comparative analysis
of preferences and political budgetary decisions which either increase or decrease
public debts. Like other democratic countries, members of the Swiss parliament
vote on legal and constitutional amendments which affect public debts. But in
contrast to other countries, all changes to the law may be subject to a ‘facultative
referendum’, i.e. citizens can demand a popular vote on the respective changes
before they are enacted. Moreover, all constitutional amendments have to pass a
popular vote. Finally, a group of citizens can also start an initiative and demand a
specific constitutional amendment; members of parliament then express their
opinion on amendments proposed by these initiatives.
Constituents reveal their preferences for policy outcomes in referenda by ranking
law proposals against the status quo (see Schneider et al. 1981; Frey 1994; Besley
and Coate 2008; Brunner et al. 2011; Portmann et al. 2012). We match the results of
eight budgetary decisions from 2008 to 2011 with the individual voting data for
Swiss members of parliament on the identically worded decisions in parliament.
Thus, we directly observe whether the members of parliament from both chambers
have voted in line with the majority of their constituents in decisions affecting
public debts. We offer a first explorative analysis drawing on the Swiss setting
which constitutes an ideal field to study the importance that political representatives
place on their constituents’ preferences regarding public debts.
In order to evaluate the gap between politicians and constituents with respect to
public debts, it is necessary to assess all referenda to determine whether they affect
the fiscal balance. Almost any political decision entails certain fiscal consequences
or facilitates the introduction of new laws which in turn have fiscal consequences.
Our identification of budgetary issues increasing or decreasing debts is based on the
official documentation, i.e. on the official booklets sent to voters several weeks
before the referendum takes place. Consequently, we classify the referenda
according to the official information voters receive and on which they base their
decisions.
Our study benefits from an important advantage. Because our research focuses on
differences within a single country, it avoids problems common to cross-country
research. When analyzing political decisions and preferences across countries,
specific norms, rules, political patterns, history, culture and institutional contexts
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should be taken into account. In our case, the sub-national electoral districts provide
a broad empirical field within a common framework.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the
literature on the representation of voter preferences and referenda. Section 3
presents a short overview of the Swiss political system, highlights the role of
referenda and details how we match representatives’ behavior in parliament with
citizens’ opinions in referenda. Explorative results for all members of parliament
from both chambers are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 offers some
concluding remarks.
2 Literature
When electoral competition works along a single policy dimension, candidates
represent the median voters’ position according to Downs (1957). This appealing
theoretical prediction of convergence contrasts with the literature on legislative
shirking and empirical studies on representation which show that systematic
deviations from voters’ interests occur (see Kau and Rubin 1978, 1979; Lott and
Davis 1992; Stratmann 1995; Bender and Lott 1996; Gerber and Lewis 2004;
Stadelmann et al. 2012a, b). A critical assessment of spatial voting models and their
alternatives is offered by Grofman (2004).1
Legislators seem to react to other stimuli than voters’ preferences. In particular,
interest groups and campaign contributions may influence their decisions (see, e.g.,
Denzau and Munger 1986; Stratmann 1992). Moreover, political parties and their
respective ideologies are also likely to matter (see, e.g., Alesina and Rosenthal
1989; Levitt 1996; Carey 2007; Stadelmann et al. 2012b).
The measurement of voters’ preferences and their match with legislators’
behavior is central to the empirical literature on political representation. The major
difficulty lies in determining congruence levels between voters and politicians (see
Golder and Stramski 2010 and Matsusaka 2010 for recent discussions). Voters’
views are represented by politicians if the latter cast the same vote on a legislative
issue that voters would have if they had been in a position to do so. Since such a
direct measure for congruence is usually not available, congruence between
politicians and voters is usually measured by surveys or ‘‘ideology scores’’ such as
the ADA scores in the United States (see, e.g., Kenny and Lotfinia 2005; Lo´pez and
Ramı´rez 2008). To obtain proxies for district majority preferences, legislators’
scores are usually regressed on districts’ characteristics and the fitted ADA scores
are considered to represent the district’s interests, whereas the residuals exhibit the
politician’s divergence from his/her constituency. Such measures based on
constituency characteristics have been criticized as inappropriate measures of
legislative preferences by Krehbiel (1993), among others. Matsusaka (2010)
highlights the limitations of different scores as they do not directly match voters’
choices with politicians’ behavior.
1 Dow (2001) and again Grofman (2004) provide excellent reviews of the literature on party competition.
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A small number authors discuss the effects of referenda on the political process,
citizens’ representation and citizens’ wellbeing (see, e.g., Frey 1994; Matsusaka 1995;
Gerber 1996; Feld and Matsusaka 2003). Only a few scholars consider roll call votes or
referenda outcomes as measures for constituents’ representation (see Hersch and
McDougall 1988; Garrett 1999). More recently, Gerber and Lewis (2004) draw on a
dataset from California and compare legislators’ roll call votes on a unidimensional
NOMINATE scale to districts’ median voter preferences estimated from referenda.
Our approach overcomes problems of measures for legislators’ and voters’
positions constructed from ideology scores or surveys. We directly compare
representatives’ roll call votes and citizens’ preferences revealed in referenda which
either increase or decrease debts. The use of such a direct measure of congruence
has recently also been suggested by Matsusaka (2010) for the United States.
Brunner et al. (2011) apply it to Californian data and advocate that results may be
generalized to other U.S. states.2
With respect to preferences for expenditure on local public goods, A˚gren et al.
(2007) investigate survey responses from Swedish citizens and politicians. They
find that politicians have higher preferences for higher expenditures then citizens.
However, we are not aware of any contributions in the literature which use revealed
preferences in referenda and roll call votes in parliament in order to explore
congruence between politicians and constituents with respect to legislative
proposals influencing public debts.
As argued by Eusepi and Wagner (2012), parliamentary assemblies do not
necessarily trade on their own account. In their dealings they may deviate from
voters’ preference for debt because they may follow the notion of a ‘‘monopolistic
republic’’ or because they may lack accurate information. Therefore, it is crucial to
know whether they act in the interest of voters or not.
3 Measuring voters’ preferences and legislators’ decisions
3.1 Parliamentary decisions and referenda
Switzerland’s federal constitution, dating back to 1848, established a bicameral
parliament called the Federal Assembly. The Swiss constitutional setting has
basically been modeled according to the United States. The parliament comprises
two houses, the National Council (‘‘Nationalrat’’ in German; comparable to the U.S.
House of Representatives) and the Council of States (‘‘Sta¨nderat’’ in German;
comparable to the U.S. Senate). Members of both councils are elected in the same
26 districts (Swiss cantons) and serve four-year terms.
The Swiss National Council has 200 seats. Its members are elected under a
system of proportional representation. The number of representatives for each
canton is proportional to its population size. Population size and, thus, the number
of seats differ widely between cantons. For example, six cantons have only one
2 In thematically completely different contributions we also discuss how this congruence measure
generalizes (see Stadelmann et al. 2012a, b).
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representative in the National Council: Appenzell i.R., Appenzell a.R., Glarus,
Nidwalden, Obwalden and Uri. Thirteen electoral districts have between one and
five members of parliament, while the remaining cantons have more than five
members of parliament.
The Swiss Council of States has 46 seats. For historical reasons, there are 20 ‘‘full
cantons’’ and 6 ‘‘half cantons’’ making a total of 23 so called ‘‘Sta¨nde’’. There is no
important difference between full and half cantons except that the latter have only
one member in the Council of States.3 The six half cantons are Basel-Stadt and
Basel-Land, Obwalden and Nidwalden, along with Appenzell a.R. and Appenzell
i.R. The councilors are elected by majority rule.4 Thus, we are able to analyze
representation of constituents’ preferences for different electoral systems, a majority
system for the Council of States and a proportional system for the National Council.
Parliamentary committees are concerned with elaborating policy proposals in
different areas such as foreign affairs, social security, health, etc. These committees
formulate proposals for new laws and changes to existing laws. A proposal is
adopted as a new law or as a constitutional amendment, if the majorities of both the
National Council and the Council of States approve it.
However, proposals adopted by parliament do not necessarily turn into law.
Switzerland features a system of direct democracy where referenda may be held;
this is a system similar to that in over half of the states in the United States. There
are three types of popular votes (see Stadelmann et al. (2012b) for additional details
and descriptions):
1. Citizens can challenge a law that has been passed by parliament by means of a
facultative referendum which requires collecting at least 50,000 signatures
within 100 days. Out of approximately 4.9 million registered voters, 50,000
signatures represent less than 1 % of the population which is all that is required
to demand a referendum. The proposed law or law change is rejected if a simple
majority of the voters decides against it.
2. Parliamentary proposals to change the constitution are subject to a mandatory
referendum. The constitutional change has to be confirmed by a ‘‘double
majority’’. This means that in addition to a majority of all voters in the country,
voter majorities in ‘‘eleven and a half cantons’’ (a majority of the ‘‘Sta¨nde’’)
have to accept the constitutional change too.
3. Citizens may propose a constitutional amendment and demand a referendum on
their proposal by collecting at least 100,000 signatures (the aforementioned
‘‘initiative’’). The signatures have to be collected within 18 months. An
3 The reason for the existence of ‘‘half cantons’’ is purely historical: When a canton separated into two
parts, be it because of religious or socio-economic tensions, the new parts were counted only as half
cantons, i.e. the new parts did not get more seats in the Council of States than the old unit, which provides
the citizens of each canton with incentives for not being too eager to separate. An exception to this rule
was made in 1979 when the old Canton of Berne separated into the full Canton of Jura and the new full
Canton of Berne, which remained the second largest canton.
4 The only exception is the Canton of Jura where the two members are elected by proportional voting.
Omitting them does not change the results. Citizens of the Canton of Neuchaˆtel voted in favor of
changing the electoral system from majority voting to proportional representation on September 26, 2011;
all parliamentary decisions in our sample took place before this date.
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initiative formulates the precise wording of the new amendment as it has to be
added to the constitution. Members of parliament are required to hold a vote on
the text of an initiative. Their vote serves as a parliamentary recommendation to
voters. Parliament and the government can neither change the wording of an
initiative nor can they refuse an initiative, unless it violates formal rules.
However, they can work out a counter-proposal to the initiative which is
presented to the voters at the same time as the initiative in a referendum.
Usually, a counter-proposal is designed to be a compromise between the current
status quo and the demands stipulated in the initiative.
We analyze a sample of eight referenda which affect public debts from 2007 to
2011. For this period of time, data on individual roll call votes for the National
Council and the Council of States are available. We identify referenda which affect
public debts by referring to the official information given to Swiss voters before a
referendum. Before the referendum takes place, voters receive an official booklet by
post. This booklet provides information on the referendum issue in a neutral form
and includes the exact text of the legislative paragraphs to be modified or introduced
in the law or the constitution. For facultative referenda and initiatives, the counter
committees which have collected signatures may point out their arguments and
parliament usually points out its position too. Thus, citizens get the full view of not
only the issue at stake, but also the different perspectives on it.
The official booklet allows the identification of referenda which increase or
reduce public debts. We identify potentially debt increasing or reducing referenda
by analyzing whether the booklet points out to voters any increases or decreases in
expenditure or decreases or increases in taxation, i.e. affects the budget in a clear
direction. Clearly, any law change may affect the budget even though it is not stated
directly.5 However, as we are interested in referenda results with respect to
politicians’ decisions, the most straightforward method is to focus on the officially
and easily available information which voters have when they decide.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics regarding the type of referenda
analyzed.
Out of the eight budgetary referenda, four are debt increasing and four are debt
reducing. Mandatory and facultative referenda make up half of the analyzed cases,
the other half are initiatives. Out of the total of eight referenda, 50 % have been
adopted. The average cantonal share of acceptance amounts to 39.9 %. Thus, some
referenda have also been clearly rejected which introduces an important variation in
the referenda results which we can exploit for our empirical analysis.
5 Consider for example, the initiative of November 28, 2010 to facilitate the deportation of criminal
foreigners. While the initiative may increase enforcement costs it may reduce total costs as foreigners do
not spend time in Swiss prisons. In such cases, it would be most difficult to estimate the budgetary
consequences and impossible to get a consensus about these estimates. Therefore, the official booklet
does not explicitly state any budgetary consequences and therefore we do not classify the referendum as a
potentially debt increasing or debt reducing one.
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3.2 Matching legislators’ decisions with constituents’ preferences
Referenda results determine policy outcomes and at the same time reveal the
preferences of citizens for these outcomes. Referenda permit voters to rank the
expected policy outcomes of proposed laws against the status quo as pointed out by
Schneider et al. (1981). Referenda produce dichotomous results which indicate what
a majority prefers and consequently, what the median constituent prefers. Moreover,
decisions in referenda are capable of capturing much broader issues than financial
streams and it is not necessary to rely on experts’ judgments or surveys concerning
the utility implications for the majority.
Referenda data can be matched with voting data from members of parliament.
The wording of the referendum text presented to the voter is the same as the one
which members of parliament voted upon. This fact makes Switzerland an ideal
field to study the relationship between constituents and politicians. According to
Krehbiel (1993), roll call votes are most proximate to the adoption of governmental
policies. The vote in the Swiss parliament is binding and policy-relevant which
starkly contrasts with the electoral platforms of political parties and individual
candidates. The same applies to referendum decisions which are implemented right
after the popular vote. Thus, referenda have a much more direct influence on policy
than voter surveys.
All roll calls in the National Council are carried out through an electronic voting
system. The parliamentary services make all individual votes registered by the
system publically available. In contrast, there is no electronic voting system in the
Council of States. However, a camera has recorded the Councils’ sessions since
winter 2006. We have analyzed the video streams and identified individual voting
behavior. In a small number of cases, the camera position does not allow
identification, but there is no systematic component regarding the decisions and
politicians not identified. Our analysis includes all roll call votes on all budgetary
referenda since footage from the cameras in the Council’s meeting room became
available.6
Table 1 Debt increasing and debt reducing referenda from 2008 to 2011
All referenda
Number of debt increasing referenda 4
Number of debt reducing referendy 4
Number of facultative or mandatory referenda 4
Number of initiatives 4
Share of accepted referenda 50 %
Cantons voting ‘‘yes’’ on average 39.9 %
6 Note that members of parliament may be absent or abstain from voting due to sickness, travel, political
duties, professional bias, or other responsibilities.
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We analyze the quality of political representation of the majority of constituents.
Democratic decisions are majority decisions and representation of the majority is a
natural benchmark case for members of parliament from single and multi-member
districts.
Our data on matched Swiss referenda and final votes exhibit several advantages
(see Stadelmann et al. (2012b) or Brunner et al. (2011) for a similar discussion on
advantages and generalizability). Voters’ preferences are measured on precisely the
same dimensions as politicians’ positions and both cast their votes on exactly the
same legislative proposal with identical wording. Information embodied in
referenda is much richer than ideology measures. Moreover, preferences are not
constructed but observed. Both decisions, i.e. in parliament and in referenda, are
real decisions with policy consequences and thus much less superficial than
responses given in surveys. In Switzerland, popular votes are also preceded by an
intensive public discourse which usually takes 6–8 weeks, or even longer.
Therefore, it is fair to say that citizens are much better informed on the respective
issues when voting then when answering survey questions. Thus, comparing the roll
call votes of legislators with the preferences of the majority of constituents yields a
natural and direct measure for congruence, which allows new and interesting
insights.
In spite of these advantages, some readers may argue that not all decisions are
necessarily presented to voters in a referendum and they may therefore wonder
whether the results generalize. We briefly argue why the results are likely to
generalize. Firstly, for constitutional amendments, a referendum is always
mandatory. Moreover, for law changes, there is a low signature requirement for
referenda and less than 1 % of the population is required for a referendum on a
parliamentary decision. Subsequently, this ensures that even decisions which are
only weakly controversial in parliament may be subject to a referendum. This is
because a referendum committee (the group collecting signatures) expects to have a
chance to win the majority’s support in a referendum or to at least get widespread
public attention. By including initiatives which are initiated directly by citizens, we
mitigate for selection and agenda setting problems in parliament. Initiatives allow
citizens to introduce issues which legislators have neglected and, consequently, lead
to better coverage of all policy dimensions relevant for constituents. In addition, the
potential threat of a facultative referendum or initiatives gives legislators no
systematic incentive to vary their behavior based on whether a referendum will
actually occur or not. This is because politicians can never be certain whether their
decisions will be challenged by a referendum. Thus, our matches between
politicians and citizens do not only cover broad policy issues but are also a
representative sample for issues decided in parliament. Finally, Switzerland is not
the only country where referenda exist and are important. Brunner et al. (2011)
analyze a similar setting as ours for California and suggest generalizability of the
central results.
To summarize, our setting and the data allow us to identify empirically whether
members of parliament from both chambers diverge from voters’ preferences for
budgetary decisions and debt increasing/reducing decisions in particular.
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4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Baseline match between constituents and representatives
In a first step to evaluate the responsiveness of representatives to constituents, we
analyze the direct match of representatives’ decisions and constituents’ decisions.
That is, we compare whether representatives decided on legislative proposals in the
same way as their constituents. We therefore compare the match between members
of parliament and their constituents for all debt increasing and debt reducing
referenda. Constituents reveal their preferences only after legislators have voted.
Thus, legislators are required to accurately forecast the decisions of their
constituents in order to vote in conjunction with their constituencies’ preferences
which results in a unique measure for divergence as argued by Garrett (1999).7 In
common with other parliamentary democracies, Swiss legislators also use surveys,
elections, personal contacts, etc. to become informed about constituents’
preferences.
Each pair of roll call votes and referendum results is analyzed as a single event of
either ‘‘match/congruence’’ or ‘‘non-match/divergence’’. For instance, a legislator
from the Canton of Zurich who votes ‘‘yes’’ on the budgetary highly relevant
‘‘Corporate Tax Reform Act II’’ matches his constituency’s majority opinion and,
thus, the preferences of the majority of voters if at least 50 % of voters from the
Canton of Zurich also vote ‘‘yes’’ in the referendum. In each case, we present
separate results for members of the National Council and members of the Council of
States to account directly for differences in the electoral system.
Table 2 presents the congruence between legislators and their constituents. The
first column reports the results for members of the National Council and the second
column reports results for members of the Council of States.
In 68.6 % of all analyzed legislative and popular decisions with either debt
increasing or debt reducing consequences, members of the National Council vote in
line with constituents’ preferences as shown in column (1), line (a). If the legislative
choices of politicians were purely random, i.e. not influenced by constituents’
preferences or other factors, we should observe that a politician agrees in half of the
cases with the population of his/her electoral district. Put differently, legislators
tossing a coin would agree in 50 % of the cases with the majority of their respective
districts even if there is no relationship between the politician and the constituency
(see Krehbiel 1993 for a similar argument). The p value in parenthesis indicates that
matches between representatives and constituents occur significantly more often
than in 50 % of all cases. Thus, observed congruence between legislators elected
under proportional representation and constituents’ preferences is approximately
18.6 % points higher for budgetary referenda than for the purely random choice
assumption where members of the Council of States toss a coin.
7 Naturally, legislators have to decide first as only then can divergence to voters be measured reasonably.
Similarly, in other countries without referenda, surveys on specific laws can only be conducted after laws
have been enacted. Otherwise surveys would be of a purely hypothetical nature.
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The comparable congruence is higher for members of the Council of States who
are elected under a majority system. In 80.3 % of all legislative decisions affecting
the budget, they vote in line with their constituents’ preferences as shown in column
(2), line (a). Consequently, the observed congruence for members of the Council of
States in budgetary decisions is approximately 30.3 % points higher than with the
random voting assumption.
Next, we split the referenda analyzed into two distinct groups, i.e. we analyze
debt increasing and debt reducing issues separately in lines (b) and (c). Generally,
we observe that members of both chambers match constituents’ preferences more
often in debt increasing than in debt reducing referenda.8 For members of the
National Council, we observe a congruence of 70.4 % between them and their
constituents for debt increasing referenda. The match between members of the
National Council and constituents is 56.5 % which is far lower than for debt
reducing referenda. Similar results also hold for members of the Council of States.
The match between members of the Council of States and constituents is 87.1 %
when only debt increasing referenda are analyzed and 56.1 % when focusing on
debt reducing referenda.
Thus, this first analysis of the data reveals comparatively higher matches between
politicians for debt increasing referenda, while for referenda aiming to decrease
debts, we observe low matches. These results do not necessarily imply that
politicians try to increase their immediate budgetary leeway as might at first be
expected from a strict public choice theory perspective. One has to be careful when
interpreting the above congruence results. They only provide a direct interpretation
of how politicians represent their constituents for either debt reducing or debt
increasing referenda.
Table 2 Match between politicians and their constituents
(1)
Match between votes of members of
teh National Council and the majority
of their constituents
(2)
Match between votes of members of
the Council of States and the majority
of their constituents
(a) All referenda
(combined debt
increasing and
reducing)
68.55 %
(0.0000)
80.28 %
(0.0000)
(b) Debt increasing
referenda
70.35 %
(0.000)
87.14 %
(0.000)
(c) Debt reducing
referenda
56.47 %
(0.0005)
56.08 %
(0.1395)
Values in brackets are p values of the t test testing the average match of the corresponding parliamen-
tarians in the sample against the baseline match of 50 %
8 We focus on the explorative analysis of the data as such a direct comparison of constituents’
preferences for debts and legislators’ behavior has never been performed before in the literature and
existing theory is unclear about the relationship we should observe.
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4.2 Influence of a constituency’s preferences on legislators
In the second step, we estimate a logistical model to explain the ‘‘yes-vote’’ of
legislators in both chambers according to whether voters in their electoral district
accepted or rejected a referendum. Instead of focusing on the average congruence
between voters and legislators under proportional and majority systems, we quantify
directly the importance that legislators place on their constituents’ preferences for or
against debts. We estimate the effect of the predicted majority’s ‘‘yes-vote’’ in a
referendum on the probability that the legislator will agree on the same issue in
parliament. Our explanatory variable is the share of ‘‘yes votes’’ in the canton of the
representative which is centered on a tie decision to facilitate interpretation. In other
words, the variable CantonYesCentered used in Table 3 takes the number of ‘‘yes
votes’’ in a canton minus 50 % such that a value of 0 reflects a perfect tie between
supporters and opponents in the district population.
4.2.1 Interpreting the effects
We take account of the type of referendum by introducing a separate dummy for
debt reducing referenda. Moreover, we account for different voting behavior
between the two chambers by splitting the observations into a sample for the
National Council and one for the Council of States. We then perform regressions for
each of these samples separately.
Results of the logistical model are presented in Table 3. We use district level
clustering to correct standard errors which are given in parenthesis. We calculate
discrete changes of all variables and report robust standard errors for changes in
probability using the Delta method.9
Specification (1) shows that the probability of a member of the National Council
agreeing to a law proposal affecting public debts increases when the share of ‘‘yes
votes’’ by district voters increases. This is reflected by the positive coefficient for
the variable CantonYesCentered which indicates that the share of ‘‘yes votes’’ above
50 % has an effect on the probability of the politician voting ‘‘yes’’. We observe that
the identifier for debt reducing referenda is significant and negative which indicates
that the members of the National Council tend to vote ‘‘yes’’ more often if the
legislative proposal aims to increase debt. This result is consistent with the simple
public choice argument that the option of debt financing provides present politicians
with new resources to target specific interests. This is because it increases the
financial leeway of politicians during their relatively short term in office while it
narrows the leeway of future politicians during the long term of debt reimburse-
ment. Debt increasing referenda are more likely to increase the leeway of politicians
than debt reducing referenda. Nevertheless, in general, politicians seem to place
importance on their district voters’ preferences for budgetary referenda.
Specification (2) tests whether politicians from the National Council place
different importance on the ‘‘yes vote’’ of their constituents in the case of debt
9 Ai and Norton (2003) suggest the Delta method to calculate the standard errors of discrete effects for
correct estimation.
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reducing referenda. Therefore, we interact the dummy for debt reducing referenda
with the variable CantonYesCentered. The base effect of the influence of
constituents’ preferences on votes of members of the National Council remains
comparable to specification (1). The interaction term is negative, small in size and
not significant. Thus, National Councilors do not place a different importance on
their constituents for debt reducing than for debt increasing referenda. They only
tend to vote ‘‘yes’’ less often for debt reducing referenda, but on average they place
the same importance on changes as their constituents for debt reducing and debt
increasing referenda.
In general, the match between members of the Council of States and their
constituents is higher than the match between members of the National Council and
their constituents. We analyze the effect of the variable CantonYesCentered on the
probability that a member of the Council of States votes ‘‘yes’’. Similar to before,
the effect of the variable CantonYesCentered is positive and highly significant in
specification (3). The reaction of members of the Council of States to changes in the
‘‘yes vote’’ of constituents is similar to members of the National Council when
calculating the discrete effect for the eight cases of budgetary referenda analyzed
here.
In specification (4) we again interact the identifier for debt decreasing referenda
with the variable CantonYesCentered. The base effect of the influence of
constituents’ preferences on votes of the members of the Council of States remains
comparable to specification (3). The interaction term is not significant, but it is
positive. Thus, members of the Council of States also seem to place the same
importance on their constituents in debt reducing and debt increasing referenda.
However, they do not have a higher probability to vote ‘‘no’’ for debt reducing
referenda as opposed to their colleagues in the National Council who are elected by
proportional rule.
4.2.2 Interpreting the effects
We interpret the importance that average politicians place on their constituency by
predicting the probability that a politician accepts a referendum (voted ‘‘yes’’ in
parliament) as a function of the share of constituents accepting the referendum. For
all estimates in Table 3 we calculate discrete effects which are presented next to the
coefficient estimates. A discrete effect represents the change in the probability of a
member of parliament to vote ‘‘yes’’ when the respective independent variable
changes while all other variables are evaluated at their median. For the variable
CantonYesCentered, we calculate a discrete effect for a change from -0.10 to
?0.10. This corresponds to a shift in the acceptance of a referendum by
constituents, from 40 to 60 %.
We observe that for budgetary referenda, members of the National Council
increase the probability to vote ‘‘yes’’ by 29.8 % points when their constituents
agree at a rate of 60 % instead of 40 % as shown by the discrete effect in column (1)
of Table 3 next to the coefficient estimate. They are 9.0 % points less likely to
accept a debt reducing referendum when all other variables are held at their median
and 50 % of the people accept the referendum, i.e. CantonYesCentered equals zero.
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Finally, members of the National Council are 14.0 % points more likely to vote
against an initiative. All these results remain stable when we interact the variable
CantonYesCentered with the identifier for debt reducing referenda.
For members of the Council of States we find that they respond equally to
changes in constituents’ preferences when compared with members of the National
Council. The discrete effect of the variable CantonYesCentered corresponds to
29.3 % points as indicated in column (3) of Table 3. However, we observe that this
effect drops slightly to 26.6 % points because members of the Council of States
place slightly more importance on their constituents in the case of debt reducing
referenda.10
Figure 1 summarizes the main results. We present the importance that legislators
place on constituents by varying their support from 35 to 65 %, i.e. CantonYesCentered
varies from -0.15 to 0.15. Note that this variation reflects well the actually
observed variation in citizens’ approval between cantons, i.e. we do not predict out
of the sample.
The solid curve represents the effect of a change in the share of constituents
accepting the referendum minus 50 % (centered at 50 %) on the probability that a
member of the National Council (left panel) or a member of the Council of States
(right panel) accepts the referendum. Thus, the curve represents the base effect of
the variable CantonYesCentered which is equal to zero when exactly 50 % of
constituents agree to the referendum.
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Fig. 1 Probability of representatives to vote as district population. The figure shows the probability that
an MP accepts the referendum (voted YES) as a function of his/her share of constituents voting YES from
members of the National Council (left panel) and members of the Council of States (right panel). The
predictions for the probability are constructed from the results of Table 3, Column (1) and Column (3).
The solid line represents the effect of a change in the share of constituents accepting the referendum—
50 % (centered at 50 %) on the probability that an MP accepts the referendum for an average referendum
(base effect of CantonYesCentered). The dotted lines give the 95 % confidence interval
10 Although the interaction term has no significant effect, its inclusion reduces the predicted discrete
effect for the variable CantonYesCentered.
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We observe that politicians from both chambers place importance on their
constituents in the case of those referenda which affect public debts.11 If the support
of constituents for a referendum affecting public debts in either way increases then
politicians are more likely to vote ‘‘yes’’ too. Members of the Council of States
place a slightly higher importance on their constituents when constituents’ support
is fairly low. That is, the curve for members of the Council of States is slightly
steeper and starts at a higher level of congruence than it does for members of the
National Council. In general, the reaction of the two groups of politicians to
constituents’ preferences over the analyzed spectrum is similar but the additional
importance members of the Council of States place on constituents ebbs out at a
high level.
5 Conclusion
Political representation concerns the correspondence between legislators’ behavior
and the will of constituents. The behavior of politicians towards their constituents is
particularly important for political decisions affecting public debts. This paper fills
an important gap in the literature by directly considering congruence between the
preferences of the majority of constituents and legislators for public debt decisions.
Under an institutional setting comparable to some US states and other jurisdictions
using direct democratic instruments, we use quasi-experimental data and match
revealed citizens’ preferences with legislators’ roll call votes in parliament.
Constituents regularly reveal their preferences in popular referenda in Switzerland.
Representatives to the Swiss National Council and the Swiss Council of States vote
on exactly the same legislative proposals with identical wording as people vote on
in referenda. We identify those referenda potentially affecting public debts and
analyze how legislators represent their constituents’ preferences for debt increasing
and debt reducing proposals.
Our empirical results suggest that legislators of both chambers deviate in
decisions concerning public debts from the preferences of the majority of their
constituents. Members of the National Council who are elected under proportional
representation vote on average 18.6 % points more with their constituents in
budgetary decisions than a purely random model of politicians flipping a coin would
predict. The respective match is higher for members of the Council of States who
are elected under majority voting. Politicians of both chambers match the majority
of their constituents at a lower level for debt reducing than for debt increasing
referenda. However, additional results show that they place approximately the same
importance on changes in constituents’ preferences for both types of referenda.
Finally, we find that politicians elected under proportional rule tend to vote more in
favor for debt increasing proposals while there is no significant difference for
members of the Council of States elected by majoritarian rule for debt increasing or
debt reducing proposals.
11 Note that from the estimates we know that they place approximately the same importance on
constituents’ preferences for debt reducing as well as debt increasing referenda.
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When interpreting these direct empirical results, they first may seem to be at odds
with the view that politicians tend to increase public debts while citizens tend to
reduce them. We only find a certain tendency for politicians elected by proportional
rule to vote for increasing debts but the importance they place on changes in their
constituents’ preferences is not affected by this behavior. However, as the match
with preferences of constituents in general is fairly low, we may speculate that
politicians try to maximize their own utility function.12 Our results indicate that
politicians are not necessarily interested in simply increasing their budgetary leeway
by going for higher debts. Instead, they may tend to have more specific and more
individual goals than a simple theory of increasing public debts for personal leeway
would predict.
We aim to conduct further analyses to test these hypotheses. We are collecting
information on representatives’ interest affiliations and their professions. These data
should permit us in the future to estimate the joint influence of legislators’ personal
characteristics combined with the task of representing constituents’ preferences in
real legislative decisions affecting public debts. Moreover, an interesting field of
research for the future would be to focus on the competing influence of voters and
interest groups when analyzing politicians’ decisions.
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